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INTRODUCTION

There is a growing movement in international law to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples.' This move' Although definitions of "indigenous peoples" vary, a 1986 report of U.N.
Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo is informative:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct fron other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them.
They form at present non-dominant sectors of the society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
Josd Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, U.N. ESCOR, 1 3V Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 4, paras. 379-80, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4 (1995).
397
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ment is a history of exploitation and colonization of indigenous
peoples throughout the world and in response to the resulting
deprivation of basic fundamental rights suffered by them. 2 The
indigenous peoples affected by colonization and exploitation are
many, and include, but are not limited to, such groups as the
indigenous peoples of Australia, the Indian, Inuit, Metis and
other indigenous peoples of Canada, the Maori in New Zealand,
the Yanomami and other indigenous peoples of Brazil and the
Amazon, the indigenous peoples of African nations such as the
Ogoni People of Nigeria and the Maasai of Kenya, and the Native Americans of the United States. 3 The Native American indigenous peoples are also many, and include such distinct tribes
as the Navajo Nation in the southwestern United States, the
Cherokee and Seminole Nations in the southeast, the Sioux Na-4
tion of the midwest, and the Yakima Nation of the northwest.
The movement of international indigenous rights in the
20th century has culminated in two declarations of change: the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
to the Commission on Human Rights 5 and the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 6 These declarations
broke new ground in addressing indigenous rights including the
right to self-determination, the right to internal governance and
See generally Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples:
A Global Comparativeand InternationalLegal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57
(1999) (reviewing the legacy of conquest in various arenas around the planet and
the status of indigenous peoples under domestic law).
3 See id.
4 "An Indian tribe constitutes a body of Indians of the same or similar race,
united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular, though sometimes ill-defined, territory." 41 AM. JuR. 2D Indians § 3
(1995) (citing Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901)) (hereinafter Indians). "Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to limit the right of self-government of an Indian nation, has indicated that certain statutory prerequisites
must exist before a group of Indians may be considered a tribe and thereby be
eligible for special status in the law, including the requirement that Indians in a
tribe must all live on the same reservation, and must have adopted an organizational plan or constitution." Id. (citing Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp.
465 (D.D.C. 1978)).
5 See Erica-Irene A. Daes, Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eleventh Session, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Annex
1, Agenda Item 14, at 50-51, U.N Doc. E/CN.4 (1993), reprinted in 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 212 (1996) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Declaration).
6 See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 625 OEA/ser. L./V./II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter OAS
Draft Declaration].
2
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legal systems, and the right to sovereignty. 7 These declarations, however, have not been fully adopted by the United Nations and the Organization of American States.8 In fact, the
United States has not endorsed either, insisting that these declarations infringe on national sovereignty and promote secession and disintegration.9
The United States' reluctance to endorse either of the indigenous rights declarations is not surprising in light of the government's continuing treatment of Native Americans. 10
Notwithstanding the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the
United States, there are signs of a trend that would at least
begin a process of change with respect to tribal sovereignty in
the United States." This slight indication of change has not,
however, been reflected in the Supreme Court, which has failed
2
to uphold tribal sovereignty in recent cases.'
7 See generally S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary
InternationalLaw, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (1991).
8 See Gustavo Capdevila, Rights: Delegates Obstruct Work of U.N. Indigenous
Groups, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 4, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 5949942 (reporting
that delegates from several governments employ tactics that prevent approval of
United Nations resolutions and declarations that concern indigenous peoples).
9 See Dean B. Suagee, Human Rights of Indigenous People: Will the United
States Rise to the Occasion? 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 376 (1997).
1OSee, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES (1994) (providing a chronological account of two centuries of treaty making and the subsequent
history of the treaties); DAVID E. WILKENS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE U.S. SuPREME COURT (1997) (providing a historical survey of U.S. Supreme
Court cases relating to tribal sovereignty).
11 See 25 U.S.C.A. § 450 (1999) (providing a congressional statement of findings that the "prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served
to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities"); see also Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (1998) (establishing
protocol for consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal governments in the
development of regulatory practices that affect their communities); and Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951
(Apr. 29, 1994) (clarifying the "responsibility to ensure that the Federal Government operates within a government-to-government relationship with federally recognized Native American tribes").
12 See generally Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Burlington N.
R. R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 522 U.S. 801 (1997); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
526 U.S. 473 (1999). Collectively, these cases may represent a recent change in
Supreme Court policy. Before these cases were decided, at least one author believed that the Supreme Court, when compared to the Presidency and Congress,
had a better track record of acknowledging tribal sovereignty and upholding treaty
rights. See WILKENS, supra note 10, at xi.
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Part II-A of this comment will provide a background on
American Indian Law and discuss the legal relationship of
American Indians with the United States. Part II-B will provide a background on developments in international indigenous
rights and outline rights proposed in international indigenous
rights declarations. Part III will review recent Supreme Court
decisions affecting tribal sovereignty and compare them with
indigenous rights declarations.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Legal Relationship Between the United States and
Native Americans

A cursory view of "Indian" law in the United States does
not leave one with the impression that Native American peoples
are (or ever have been) independent, sovereign nations with international legal status.1 3 Instead, current law portrays Native
American nations as dependent political communities placed
under the care and control of the Federal Government and sub14
ject to a broad plenary power of Congress.
What then provides the foundation for a view that Native
Americans have been and should now be treated as independent, sovereign nations? Even before Columbus arrived in the
Americas, Native Americans had organized democratic societies.' 5 Subsequently, the English, French and Spanish settlers
established alliances with Native American nations in order to
expand their sphere of commerce and influence. 16 The European nations, however, were at odds with the colonists, who
were eager to take over Indian lands without negotiation or
13 See generally Indians, supra note 4, §§ 7-15.

14 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (adopting the doctrine

that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs). See also Philip P. Frickey,
DomesticatingFederal Indian Law, 81 MImN. L. REV. 31, 35 (1996) (providing an

overview of the Kagama case and criticizing the decision as an "embarrassment of
constitutional theory... logic . . . and humanity.")
15 See Larry Sager, RediscoveringAmerica: Recognizing the Sovereignty of Native American Indian Nations, 76 U. DEW. MERCY L. REV. 745, 771 (1999).
16 See Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future:Native American Sovereignty
in the 21st Century, 20 NYU REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217, 229 (1993) (citing STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 11-50 (1988)).
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compensation.1 7 This tension is apparent in a 1763 Royal Proclamation from England that held void treaties and land
purchases made by the colonies or individual settlers without
approval of the Crown.'
Some commentators assert that the American political system was fashioned from a combination of Native American and
European political theories and is analogous to the Iroquois
Confederacy of the five Indian nations of the Mohawk, Seneca,
Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida clans. 19 In fact, even Benjamin
Franklin recognized the Iroquois Confederacy and commented
on its political unity. 20 Thus, the foundation for viewing Native
Americans as independent sovereign nations begins with the
recognition that such native political sovereigns existed before
America was settled by Europeans; but it does not end there.
The Constitution provided Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." 2 1 Some have argued that
as the Commerce Clause lists "Indian tribes" distinctly from
"foreign Nations," it is logical to conclude that Native American
tribes were never considered independent nations. 22 Others
have argued, however, that Indians were distinctly enumerated
in order to make clear that the government's regulations and
treaties with Indian nations, and not the states, would be supreme. 23 The latter argument is substantiated by the fact that
the formal mode of conducting diplomatic relations with the In17 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 234 (citing Letter from George Washington to
James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY (Francis P. Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990)).
18 See id. at 235.
19 See Sager, supra note 15, at 787, n.164 (citing RoxANNE DUNBAR ORTIZ, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION 2 (1984)).
20 "It would be a very strange Thing, if Six Nations of Ignorant Savages
should be capable of forming a Scheme for such an Union... and yet that a like
Union should be impracticable for ten or a Dozen English Colonies. .. ." Sager,
supra note 15 at 770 ( quoting 3 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 42 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1905)).
21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
22 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (stating that the Cherokee were not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution).
23 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 235, n.132 (noting that the only debate re-

garding Indian nations during the framing of both the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution concerned the division of power between the state and federal
governments).
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dian nations was treaty-making. 24 The treaties with Indian nations were concluded in the same manner as treaties with
foreign nations and were recognized by the Supreme Court as
the supreme law of the land, superior to any state constitution
25
or law.
In the early 19th Century, many treaties were made with
Indian nations, and many were ignored in order to feed the appetite of an expansion-hungry nation. 26 A good example is the
Treaty of 1868 with the Sioux Indians that "set apart for the
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians"
the western Dakotas, eastern Montana and Wyoming.2 7 Within
just a few years of making the Treaty of 1868, the United States
Army was carrying out armed attacks against the Sioux, seizing
land, and herding them onto reservations. 28 In the end, despite
the fact that the Treaty of 1868 had never been canceled, the
United States seized the Black Hills of South Dakota from the
Sioux. 2 9 Eventually, however, Congress recognized the irony in
making treaties with Indian nations while at the same time
breaking other treaties with them. As a result, in 1871, a rider
was attached to an appropriations bill stating that thereafter,
"[n]o Indian Nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty."30 This served as an explicit signal that Native
American nations would no longer be recognized as independent nations by the United States government.
Prior to 1871, however, Congress and the Supreme Court
recognized Native American nations as independent nations,
24 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 236.
25 See id.
26 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 239, 240.
27 Treaty with The Sioux - Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa,
Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, And Santee - And Arapaho, Apr. 29,
1868, art. 2, 15 Stat 635, availableat 1868 WL 5271, 1 (Trty.) [hereinafter Treaty
of 1868].
28 See Sager, supra note 15, at 775 (citing ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., Now THAT
THE BUFFALo's GONE 47 (1984)).

29 See id. In fact, in 1980, the Supreme Court awarded the Sioux Nation
$17.1 million in damages for the illegal seizure of the Black Hills. See United
States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).

30 McSloy, supra note 16, at 243 (citing Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871,
§ 1, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1983)).
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the former by its treaties and the latter by its decisions. 3 1 For
example, in Worcester v. Georgia,3 2 the court addressed an act
passed by the Georgia legislature that purported to incorporate
certain Cherokee territory into the state and to extend Georgia's laws over the incorporated territory. 33 In addition, this act
required non-Indian persons to have a license in order to live in
Cherokee territory. 34 Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia's extension of laws over the Cherokee Nation was void as
"repugnant to the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United
States."35 Although Marshall did find some limitations to tribal
sovereignty, namely, that the tribes could not convey their land
to anyone other than the United States, and the tribes could not
make treaties with foreign nations, he also recognized that "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial ... "36 In addition, Marshall stated that the "constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be
made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable
of making treaties."37 Marshall also noted that the United
States has applied treaties with Indians as it has applied them
with the other nations of the earth, and that "[tihey are applied
to all in the same sense."3 8 Despite the early support from the
Supreme Court, however, the Cherokee were eventually removed from their lands and forced to flee across the Mississippi
39
along what has become known as the "Trail of Tears."
31 See Curtis G. Berkey, InternationalLaw and Domestic Courts Enhancing
Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 66 n.4 (1992)

(noting that the precise number of Indian treaties is not known, but estimates put
the number at over 800 prior to 1871).
32 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
33 See id. at 539.
34 See id.
35 Id. at 561.
36 Id. at 556-60.
37 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
38 Id. at 559-560.
39 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 239 (citing FRANcIs P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY IN THE FoRmATrvE YEARS 213-273 (1962)).
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As the United States was expanding west and Congress
was revoking the status of Native American tribes as independent nations, the Supreme Court clung to the concept that Indian tribes were independent nations. 40 For example, in Ex
parte Crow Dog,4 1 a member of the Sioux nation murdered a
Sioux Chief on Sioux land. 4 2 A district attorney for the Dakota
Territory arrested Crow Dog, and he was later found guilty and
sentenced to death. 4 3 The Supreme Court overturned the judgment on the grounds that the United States had no jurisdiction
over the internal affairs of the Sioux and that Crow Dog need
answer only to the laws of his nation. 44 In upholding the concept of Indian sovereignty, the Supreme Court held true to previous decisions. It would not be long, however, before pressure
from Congress and American citizens eroded this judicial
45
foothold.
Just two years after Crow Dog, Congress passed the Major
Crimes Act, which allowed federal law to be applied to Indians
for certain crimes. 4 6 The constitutionality of this Act was challenged shortly thereafter in United States v. Kagama.4 7 Unlike
Crow Dog, the Supreme Court held in Kagama that despite the
lack of constitutional authorization, "[t]he power of the general
government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection."48 Thus, in just three years, without any apparent constitutional basis, the Supreme Court went from upholding tribal
sovereignty to allowing complete congressional power over Native American Nations. This initial infringement on tribal sovpower that
ereignty subsequently developed into the plenary 49
nations.
American
Congress now holds over Native
Today, the law regards Native American tribes as domestic
dependent nations. 50 The tribes possess only those aspects of
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See McSloy, supra note 16, at 244.
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
See id. at 557.
See id.
See id. at 572.
See McSloy, supra note 16, at 245.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).

48 Id. at 384.
49 See generally Indians, supra note 4, at §§ 7-15.
50 See id. at §8 (citing Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919)).
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sovereignty that are neither withdrawn by treaty or statute nor
by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.5 1
Indian tribes do retain the attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory.5 2 This tribal sovereignty,
however, is dependent upon and subordinate to the federal government. 53 The tribes have the power, through their tribal
councils, to provide for the punishment of offenses by Indians on
the reservation, 54 to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members unless expressly limited by treaties or
55
congressional legislation.
Supreme Court recognition of tribal court sovereignty is exemplified by National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians.5 6 In National Farmers,a member of the Crow
Tribe was struck by a motorcycle in the parking lot of his elementary school. 57 A suit was filed in the Crow Tribal Court
against the School District that resulted in a default judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs.5 8 The School District and its insurer,
National Farmers Union Insurance Co., then filed a complaint
in Federal District Court seeking an injunction against execution of the Tribal Court judgment. 5 9 The District Court granted
a permanent injunction against any execution of the Tribal
Court judgment on the basis that the Crow Tribal Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the tort that was the basis of
the default judgment.6 0 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the jurisdiction of the District Court
51 See Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1979).
52 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
53 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980).
54 See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (1956).
55 See Indians, supra note 4, at §11 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981)).

56 National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845
(1985).
57 See id. at 847. The injured person was a minor returning from a school
activity. See id. The school was located on land owned by the State within the
boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. See id.
58 Id. at 847. Although process was served on the Chairman of the School
Board, he failed to notify anyone and as a result, default judgment was entered

against the School District. See id.
59 See id. at 848.
60 See id. at 849.
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could not be supported on any constitutional, statutory, or com61
mon-law ground.
In National Farmers, the main issue before the Supreme
Court was the extent to which Indian tribes have retained the
power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians. 6 2 The Court ruled
that "the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent
to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive
63
Branch policy . . . and administrative or judicial decisions."
The Court determined, however, that the examination of such
sovereignty "should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself."64 Noting that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination,
the Court found that such a policy would be supported by a rule
that allows the tribal court the first opportunity to evaluate the
factual and legal bases of a challenge against jurisdiction.6 5
Thus, the Court concluded, "[ulntil petitioners have exhausted
the remedies available to them in the Tribal Court system, it
66
would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief."
The policy of tribal sovereignty embodied in the tribal-exhaustion rule of National Farmerswas subsequently challenged
in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante.6 7 In Iowa Mutual
Insurance, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe filed a complaint in Blackfeet Tribal Court for injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. 68 Prior to any Tribal Court ruling on
jurisdiction, petitioners brought an action in Federal District
Court based on diversity of citizenship, requesting a declaration
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured. 6 9 The
61 National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 849.
62 See id. at 848.
63 Id. at 855-56.
64 Id. at 856.
65 See id.
66 National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 857.
67 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
68 See id. at 11. The plaintiff was employed by the Wellman

Ranch Company,
a Montana corporation insured by Iowa Mutual Insurance Company. See id.
While driving a cattle truck owned by the Wellman Ranch Company within the
boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation, plaintiff lost control of the vehicle and
was injured when the truck "jackknifed." Id.
69 See id. at 12-13.
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District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
70
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
In Iowa Mutual Insurance, the issue before the Supreme

Court was whether the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction
71
supplanted the federal policy of deference to tribal courts.
The Court first noted that "tribal authority over the activities of
non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal
sovereignty." 72 The Court also noted that "[clivil jurisdiction
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."73 Reiterating the long-standing policy promoting
tribal self-government and self-determination, the Court ruled
that the tribal-exhaustion rule announced in National Farmers
applies to cases based on diversity of citizenship as well.7 4
Thus, the Court concluded, regardless of the basis of federal jurisdiction, "the federal policy supporting tribal self-government
directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal
75
courts a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction."
The policy of tribal sovereignty embodied in the tribal-exhaustion rule of National Farmers and reiterated in Iowa Mu-

tual Insurance Co. gives tribal courts the opportunity to
interpret laws that affect their members and to explain why
some decisions of the federal courts are wrongly decided from
the tribal court's understanding of its own law. 76 In recent deci-

sions, however, the Supreme Court has not sustained even this
limited reservation of sovereignty. 77 Rather, as discussed in
Part III, the Supreme Court has charted a course which is
"neither constitutionally authorized nor constitutionally lim70

See id. at 13.

71 See id. at 17.

72 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18 (citing Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981)).
73 Id.

74 See id. at 16.
75 Id.

76 See Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox:Some Indian Law Reflections
from the Edge of the Prairie,31 Amiz. ST. L. J. 439, 459 (1999).
77 See generally Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Burlington N.

R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 522 U.S. 801 (1997); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
526 U.S. 473 (1999).
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ited;"7 8 a course which is even less legitimate in light of the

growing international movement respecting indigenous rights.
B. Development of InternationalIndigenous Rights
The concept of international indigenous rights began forming in the post World War II era as a result of horrors born from
the Nazi regime, which prompted a rethinking of the unlimited
discretion states had regarding the treatment of their own citizens. 79 Although not specifically related to indigenous peoples,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enacted in 1948
was the first such declaration to recognize human rights and
self-determination for peoples separate from states.8 0 These
rights were subsequently codified as legally binding agreements
in the 1966 United Nations Covenants. 8 ' International indigenous rights have subsequently been addressed by the International Labour Organization (ILO),8 2 the United Nations,8 3 and
84
the Organization of American States (OAS).

The ILO has adopted conventions on a variety of subjects
including freedom of association, the right to organize, collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor, and discrimination in
employment.8 5 The only international convention that relates
specifically to the rights of indigenous peoples is the ILO Convention No. 169.86 This Convention acknowledges that "the
state of indigenous populations has significantly changed since
1957" and that "indigenous peoples exercise control over their
own institutions, ways of life ...economic development and...
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions
78 See Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 462.
79 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 98.
80 Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
81 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 98 (citing International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360).
82 See ILO Convention No. 169, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, International Labour Conference, available at 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
83 See generally U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
84 See generally OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6.
85 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 367.
86 See id. (citing ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 82).
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As of late 1997, the Convention had been ratified by ten
countries, including Norway, Mexico, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa
88
Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru.
This convention, however, has been criticized by indigenous
groups for failing to recognize the right of self-determination.8 9
The United Nations first addressed the issue of indigenous
rights in 1971 by creating the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which was to study
the problem of discrimination against indigenous peoples. 90 In
1982, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the parent body of the human rights organs, established the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations (Working Group). 91 The
Working Group was charged with the task of reviewing developments affecting indigenous peoples and drawing up a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples for consideration by
92
the UN General Assembly.
The Working Group subsequently engaged states, indigenous peoples and others in an extended multilateral dialogue on
indigenous rights. 93 The Working Group has provided a forum
for indigenous representatives and government representatives
to express their concerns and assert their rights.9 4 Indeed, virtually every State in the Americas has participated in the discussions of the Working Group. 95 In 1993, after many years of
discussion, the Working Group finally agreed on a draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 96 In August 1994,
the Sub-Commission approved the Draft and passed it on to the
....

.-

7

87 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 128 n.300, 368 (quoting ILO Convention No.
169, supra note 82, at 1384).
88 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 100 (citing Lee Swepston, The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169): Eight Years After Adoption, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 17, 32-34 (Cynthia Price Cohen ed., 1998)).

89 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 368, 390 n.15 (citing International Indian
Treaty Council Position, OAS, IACHR, Draft of the Inter-American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.hawaii-nation.org/iitc/oas-

position.html).
90 See id. at 368, 390 n.16 (citing The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Fact Sheet
No. 9, at 5-6 (1971)).
91 See id. at 369.

92 See id. at 370.
93 See Anaya, supra note 7, at 10.
94 See id. at 10, 11.
95 See id. at 11.
96 See generally U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
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Human Rights Commission for consideration. 97 In 1995, the
Human Rights Commission established its own Working Group
(HRCWG) and set up procedures by which indigenous organizations could apply for participation at the Working Group's meetings. 98 Although the HRCWG has continued discussions on the
adoption of the Declaration, 99 only two articles have been approved over the five years of deliberations.10 0
The U.N. Draft Declaration addresses such issues as
human rights, self-determination, territorial and resource
rights, economic activities, cultural and spiritual integrity, cultural genocide, environment, health, education, and treaty enforcement. 1 1 The purpose and philosophy of the Declaration
are defined in the Preamble, which recognizes that "indigenous
peoples have been deprived of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, resulting, inter alia, in their colonization and
dispossession of their lands.., thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance
with their own needs and interests." 10 2 The Preamble also recognizes that "indigenous peoples have the right freely to determine their relationships with States in a spirit of coexistence,
mutual benefit and full respect ... [cionsidering that treaties,

agreements and other arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are properly matters of international concern and
03
responsibility."'1
One of the most controversial articles of the Declaration is
Article 3, which states that "indigenous peoples have the right
of self-determination [and] by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their eco97 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 370.
98 See id. at 371 (citing Res. 1995/32, Commission on Human Rights, U.N.

Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84 (1996)).
99 See U.N. Rights: U.N. Still at Odds Over Indigenous Rights, INTER PRESS
SERV., Dec. 14, 1998, availableat 1998 WL 19901971 (describing the November 30
to December llth session of 1998, which ended without the approval of a single
clause of the 45-point draft Declaration, despite overwhelming endorsement of the
draft by indigenous groups).
100 See Gustavo Capdevila, Rights: Delegates Obstruct Work of U.N. Indigenous
Groups, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5949942.
101
102
103

See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, at Preamble.
Id.
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nomic, social and cultural development."1 0 4 The controversy, at
least regarding the United States, is that the U.N. draft seems
to recognize collective or group rights in addition to individual
rights. The United States has taken the position that characterizing a right as belonging to a community, or collective,
rather than an individual, can be and often is construed to limit
the exercise of that right and, thus, may open the door to the
10 5
denial of the right to the individual.
The U.N. Draft Declaration contains specific statements regarding the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy legal and judicial independence from the State. First, the Preamble notes
that "treaties, agreements and other arrangements between
States and indigenous peoples are properly matters of international concern and responsibility."1 0 6 The Draft Declaration
also states that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain
and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems ...."17 In
addition, the Draft Declaration states that indigenous peoples
have the right "to maintain and develop their own indigenous
decision-making institutions." 08 These statements reflect the
desire of indigenous groups to have independent legal systems,
which are free from State usurpation and interference.
The Organization of American States (OAS) began developing their draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples in
November 1989 by recommending that the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) prepare an instrument
to protect such rights. 0 9 In September 1995, the first draft of
this instrument was sent to governments, interested organizations, experts and other entities for comments." 0 The IACHR
approved the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Id. at art. 3.
Suagee, supra note 9, at 377 (quoting U.S. Dep't of State, United States
Preliminary Statements: Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Nov. 1995)) [hereinafter U.S. Preliminary Statements].
106 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, at Preamble.
107 Id. at art. 4.
108 Id. at art. 19.
109 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 372 (citing Inter-Am. C.H.R., 245-50, OEA/
ser.LJVI.76, doc. 10 (1989)) [hereinafter Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1989].
110 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 104-105 (citing Osvaldo Kreimer, The Beginnings of the Inter-American Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 271, 272-73 (1996)).
104
105
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Indigenous Peoples at its ninety-fifth regular session and submitted it to the General Assembly and to its Permanent Council."' Although the Declaration was expected to be approved by
the member countries at the 1998 General Assembly in commemoration of the OAS fiftieth anniversary, 1 2 this did not happen. In its last meeting, however, the General Assembly
resolved to renew the mandate of the Working Group1 3so that it
may continue to consider the Proposed Declaration.
The Preamble of the OAS Draft Declaration recognizes "the
deprivation afflicting indigenous peoples ...the need to develop
national juridical systems to consolidate the pluricultural nature of our societies... [and] the responsibility of all states and
peoples of the Americas to end racism."" 4 The OAS Draft Declaration consists of twenty-seven articles addressing, in detail,
such things as human rights, legal systems, discrimination, cultural integrity, education, religious freedom, health, environmental protection, political rights, self-government, property
rights and implementation of the Draft Declaration. 1 5 The
OAS Draft Declaration expressly promotes internal self-government, the formulation and application of indigenous law, and
self-identification." 6 Separatism and secession, however, are
expressly rejected. 1 7 Although the OAS Draft Declaration is
conservative in that it excludes the option of secession, it nevertheless places a high value on individual choice and relies more
on the remedy of empowerment and self-help than on governmental action to remove the plight of the indigenous peoples." 8
Overall, the OAS Draft Declaration reflects a growing consensus on the minimum threshold of legally enforceable claims of
indigenous communities and "is a major step toward a more effective system of protection of indigenous rights not only in the
Western Hemisphere, but beyond."" 9
111 See id. at 105 (citing OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6).
112 See id. at 105.
113 See OAS G.A. Res. 1708, 3 0 th Reg. Sess., 1' Plen. Sess., (XXX-O/00) (2000),
available at http:.//www.oas.org/.
114 OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6, at Preamble.
115 See id.
116 See id. at arts. 15-6.

See id. at art. 25.
See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 107.
119 Id.
117

118
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Like the U.N. Draft Declaration, the OAS Draft Declaration also has specific statements regarding the right of indigenous peoples to have legal and judicial independence from the
State. For example, Article 4 of the Declaration states that
"[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to have their legal personality fully recognized by the states within their system." 120 In
addition, Article 16 of the Declaration reiterates that
"[i] ndigenous law shall be recognized as a part of the states' legal system" and "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain and reinforce their indigenous legal systems and also to
,,121 These
apply them to matters within their communities ....
statements make it clear that indigenous peoples desire the
States to respect and refrain from interfering with the indigenous legal system and its application to persons within its
boundaries.
While full acceptance and adoption of the various international indigenous rights declarations have yet to be realized,
these declarations reflect a growing stand against injustice and
possibly, a collective cry for help. 122 For centuries, indigenous
peoples around the world have been persecuted, ignored, and
assimilated. 123 Today, however, indigenous groups are fighting
back with these declarations and pressuring national governments to recognize them. 124 Although it is just the beginning,
125
"[r]ecognition is the first stage of the path to conciliation."
III.

APPOSITION OF RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS DECLARATIONS

The policy and laws of the United States relating to tribal
sovereignty and specifically, the tribal-exhaustion rule embodied in National Farmers12 6 and Iowa Mutual,12 7 appear to har120 OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6, at art. 4.
121 Id. at art. 16.
122 See generally Rhona K.M. Smith, The International Impact of Creative
Problem Solving. Resolving the Plight of Indigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REV.
411 (1998).

123 See id. at 419.
124 See id.
125 Id. at 423.

126 National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 845.
127 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 9.
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monize well with the declarations of indigenous peoples
regarding the right to enjoy independent legal systems. 128 New
developments regarding Indian law in the United States, however, reflect "a new, almost vicious, historical amnesia and doctrinal incoherence. " 1 29 Although no judicial policy or doctrine
can justify a dismantling of Native American sovereignty and
independence, this trend is even less justifiable in light of the
development and declarations of international indigenous
rights law.
The erosion of tribal sovereignty and the tribal-exhaustion
rule began with Strate v. A-1 Contractors.130 In Strate, vehicles
driven by petitioner Frederick and respondent Stockert collided
on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 1 3 1 The truck driven by
Stockert belonged to his employer, respondent A-1 Contractors,
a non-Indian owned enterprise with its principal place of business outside of the reservation. 132 Fredericks filed a personal
injury action in Tribal Court against Stockert and A-1 Contractors, and Fredericks' adult children filed a loss-of-consortium
claim in the same lawsuit. 13 3 The Tribal Court ruled that it had
jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied respondents' motion to dismiss. 3 4 The Northern Plains Intertribal
35
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.'
A-1 Contractors commenced an action in Federal District
Court seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate. The
complaint also sought an injunction against further Tribal
128 But see B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity:
Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM.

MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 500 (1998) (noting that the tribal court exhaustion rule is a
good news, bad news scenario, representing an opportunity for tribal courts to initially resolve disputes but giving ultimate power to federal courts to review the

tribal court decisions).
129 Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 439.
130 Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id. Neither Stockert nor Fredericks were Indians or members of the
Tribal Court. See id. Fredericks, however, was the widow of a deceased tribal
member and had five adult children who are also members. See id.
134 Strate, 520 U.S. at 438..
135 See id.
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Court proceedings. 136 The District Court dismissed the action
upon finding that the Tribal Court did have civil jurisdiction
over Fredericks' complaint. 137 On appeal, a divided panel of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.1 38 The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and, in an 8-4 decision, reversed
the District Court's judgment. 13 9 The en banc Court concluded
Court lacked
that under Montana v. United States,140 the Tribal
14
subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. '
In Strate, the Supreme Court boiled the issue down to one
question: "When an accident occurs on a portion of a public
highway maintained by the State under a federally granted
right-of-way over Indian reservation land, may tribal courts entertain a civil action against an allegedly negligent driver and
the driver's employer, neither of whom is a member of the
43
tribe?"' 4 2 First, relying heavily on Montana v. United States,
136

See id.

137 See id. at 444. The District Court relied particularly on the decisions of

National Farmers and Iowa Mutual for precedent to dismiss the case.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
141 Strate, 520 U.S. at 445. Note that in Montana, the Court was concerned
with the authority of the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within the Tribe's reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 544. The underlying issue in that case was whether the
Crow Tribe or Montana retained control over the bed of the Bighorn River. See id.
at 550-551. In denying the Crow Tribe the authority to regulate fishing on the
Bighorn River, the Court first had to determine that despite the First Treaty of
Fort Laramie and the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, which explicitly "set apart
[land] for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow Tribe, the
United States retained ownership of the riverbed as public land, which then
passed to the State of Montana when it joined the Union. Id. at 548, 551. After
ignoring the language of the Treaties and the intent of the U.S. Government to
recognize Crow ownership of the land, including the Bighorn River, the Court went
on to reiterate the general principal that except for a few exceptions, "the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe." Id. at 565. The Court also noted, however, that there are two situations in which a Tribe may retain civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee land: (1) A Tribe may regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the Tribe through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements; and (2) A tribe may also retain
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. See id. at 565-566. According to the Court, no such circumstances were involved in the case at hand. See id.
at 566.
142 Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
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the Court described a general rule that, absent specific congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation.
This rule was stated to be subject to two exceptions: "The first
exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; the second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe's political integrity,
14 4
economic security, health, or welfare."
Thus, despite the petitioners contention that National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual were the guiding precedents, the
Court reiterated that those cases enunciate only a "prudential
rule" and thus, "do not expand or stand apart from Montana's
instruction on [Indian tribes' civil authority over non-members]." 145 In reaching this outcome, the Court determined that
even though Montana involved the issue of regulatory authority
and control, its principles applied to adjudicative jurisdiction as
well. 146 The Court ruled that civil authority of Indian tribes
and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally
"does not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe...
subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and
the two exceptions identified in Montana."147 The Court concluded that neither exception in Montana applied to the case at
hand. 48 More specifically, with respect to the second exception,
the Court found that if it required no more than an interest in
the safety of tribal members on a highway, then the exception
would severely shrink the rule. 14 9
143

Montana, 450 U.S. 544; see also accompanying description in note 141

supra.
144

Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.

145 Id. at 453.

See id.
Id. The Court also considered Petitioners argument that Montana did not
control because even though the highway was maintained by the State under a
federally granted right-of-way, the highway ran across Indian reservation land
which was held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation. See id. at 454. The Court determined that the right-of-way which
was acquired by North Dakota rendered the highway, "for nonmember governance
purposes," as non-Indian land. Id.
148 See id. at 458.
149 See id. The idea that a Tribe's interest in the safety of their members on a
highway does not fall under Montana's second exception was subsequently applied
to railroad crossings. In BurlingtonN. R.R. Co. v.Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.
1997), two members of the Crow Tribe were killed when a train collided with their
146
147
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Even when actions on tribal land appear to substantially
affect the health and welfare of Native Americans, tribal sovereignty and the tribal exhaustion rule have not been applied by
the Supreme Court. 150 In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,15 ' members of the Navajo Nation filed two separate actions based on Navajo common law in the Navajo Tribal Court
against corporations that conducted uranium mining operations
on the Navajo Nation Reservation. 52 The first action involved
a suit by Arlinda and Laura Neztsosie against Rare Metals
Corp. of America, a defunct subsidiary of El Paso Natural Gas
Co., alleging personal injury arising from Rare Metal's uranium
mining activities. 153 The second action involved a suit by Zonnie
Marie Dandy Richards against Cyprus Foote Mineral Company,
successor to Vanadium Corporation of America, alleging personal injury and wrongful death arising from VCA's operation
of a uranium mine and concentrator which produced a uranium
mine tailings pile on land adjacent to the mine site.15 4 In both
cases, the defendants subsequently filed suit against the plaintiffs in Federal District Court, seeking a preliminary injunction
enjoining the plaintiffs from prosecuting their claims in Navajo
Tribal Court and seeking a declaration that the Navajo Tribal
Court had no jurisdiction over the claims. 155 In both cases, the
automobile at a railroad grade crossing south of Lodge Grass, Montana. See id. at
869. The Estates sued in tribal court and obtained a $250,000,000 judgment
against Burlington Northern. See id. Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in light
of Strate,vacated and remanded the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision that the
district court could not enjoin tribal court proceedings before tribal remedies had
been exhausted. See id. at 871.
150 See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
151 See id.
152 See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 136 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1998).
153 See id. at 613.
154 See id.
155 See id. Defendants argued that the Price Anderson Act and its legislative
history mandated exclusive federal court jurisdiction for claims arising from nuclear incidents. The Price-Anderson Act, enacted in 1957, amended the Atomic
Energy Act by adding 42 U.S.C. § 2210, as well as associated definitions in 42
U.S.C. § 2014. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). In 1966, Congress added a
new subsection, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n), which provided that a "public liability action"
arising out of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence was within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts and, if pending in any State court, might be removed for
consolidation in a single district court. Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 at 892. See
also El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473, Respondent's Brief, available at
1999 WL 14509 [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. Plaintiffs argued that since the
Defendants did not have an indemnification agreement with the government, their
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District Court denied in part, and granted in part, the defendants' request for a preliminary injunction.156 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed each of the District
Court decisions declining to enjoin the plaintiffs from pursuing
non-Price Anderson Act claims, as well as the decisions to allow
the Tribal Courts to decide in the first instance whether the
plaintiffs' claims fell within the Price Anderson Act.157 In addition, the Court of Appeals sua sponte addressed and reversed
the District Court's partial injunctions, ruling that the Price
Anderson Act contained no express jurisdictional prohibition,
which would bar the tribal court from determining its jurisdiction over Price Anderson Act claims.' 58 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded with instruc159
tions to remand the case to the District Court.
The main issue addressed by the Supreme Court was
whether the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion "should apply in
this case, which if brought in a state court would be subject to
removal." 60 The Court found that the Price Anderson Act gives
federal courts original jurisdiction over any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident and provides for removal to a federal court if a Price Anderson action is
brought in a state court. 6 1 The Court then pondered the purclaims did not arise under the Price-Anderson Act. See Respondent's Brief at *24.
In addition, Plaintiffs argued that the removal provision added to the Price-Anderson Act applied only where the original case was in State court and there was
nothing in the Act to indicate that Congress intended that term to cover tribal
courts. See id. at *27.
156 See El Paso Natural Gas, 136 F.3d at 613. The District Court denied El
Paso's request for a preliminary injunction "to the extent that it in any way seeks
to have this Court rule on any aspect ofjurisdiction of the Navajo tribal court...
except to the extent that [the Plaintiffs] seek relief based upon the Price-Anderson
Act in tribal court." Id. The consequences of those injunctions "were left in the air,
however, since the District Court declined to decide whether the Act applied to the
claims brought by the Neztsosies and Richards, leaving those determinations to
the Tribal Courts in the first instance." El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526
U.S. 473, 478 (1999). 119 S.Ct. 1430, 1434
157 See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 136 F.3d 610.
158 See id. at 615. The Court addressed this issue sua sponte because neither
the Neztsosies nor Richards had appealed the partial injunctions, which would
have prohibited the Tribal Court from hearing Price Anderson Act claims. See id.
159 See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 488.
160 Id. at 476.
161 See id. at 484.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/7

22

2000]

RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

419

pose and goals of the Price Anderson Act and stated that it
could not "think of any reason that Congress would have favored tribal exhaustion."162 When faced with the language of
the specific provision of the Price Anderson Act allowing removal from state courts only, the Court determined that Congress' failure to provide for tribal-court removal must have been
inadvertent. 163 The Court justified this determination by noting that "Congress probably would never have expected an occa16 4
sion for asserting tribal jurisdiction over claims like these."
In conclusion, the Court ruled that instead of applying the tribal exhaustion rule, "the District Court should have decided
whether respondents' claims constituted 'public liability actions'
165
arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident."
The decisions in Strate v. A-1 Contractorsand El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie represent at the very least, an infringement upon tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. 166 Navajo
Nation Council Speaker Edward T. Begay, for example, described the Neztsosie decision as "another infringement upon
the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation." 16 7 Similarly, Earl Tulley,
Vice President of Din Citizens Against Ruining the Environment, termed the Neztsosie decision "a classic example of judicial and corporate racism and arrogance. 1 68 Council Speaker
Begay further stated that "if this trend continues, there will be
so much diminishment of tribal authorities that tribal courts
are going to be rendered ineffective." 169 Irrespective of their effect on existing law, however, these decisions do not harmonize
170
well with rights recently declared by indigenous groups.
The U.N. Draft Declaration specifically states that
"[iindigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen
162

Id. at 485.

163 See id. at 487.
164

El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 487.

165 Id. at 488.
166 See Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 463. See also Brenda Norrell, Su-

preme Court Rules on Court Venue for Uranium Mining Cases in Indian Country,
INDIAN CouNTRY TODAY, May 10, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17338561.
167 See Norrell, supra note 166.
168

Id.

169 Id. (quoting Navajo Nation Speaker Edward T. Begay) quoting Navajo Na-

tion Speaker Edward T. Begay.
170 See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5; OAS Draft Declaration, supra
note 6.
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their distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems ....
"171 The OAS Draft
Declaration more specifically states that "indigenous peoples
have the right to maintain and reinforce their indigenous legal
systems and also to apply them to matters within their communities .... "-172 While the importance of an independent indigenous legal system, or tribal sovereignty, is not obvious to
everyone, 17 3 indigenous peoples of the world are nevertheless
"[cionvinced that control [by them] over developments affecting
them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them
to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions .... ,,174 Indigenous peoples of the United States are no
different. 1 75 Independent legal systems are important to indigenous peoples, including Native Americans because their culture, way of life, and control and ownership of land is unique
and "does not necessarily coincide with the systems protected
by the domestic laws of the states in which they live." 1 76 Thus,
the importance of sovereignty is that it bestows legitimacy on
177
the exercise of the indigenous political unit.
178
In many tribal communities, dual justice systems exist.
One is based on an American paradigm of justice, with its roots
in European law, and the other is based on an indigenous paradigm. 179 In the American paradigm, a hostile, adversarial system declares winners and losers, guilt and innocence. 180 The
U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, art. 4 (emphasis added).
OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6.
173 See S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998) (sponsored by Senator Slade Gorton and
abolishing tribal immunity from suit and making Indian tribal governments subject to judicial review). See also El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 485 (stating
that "[wie are at a loss to think of any reason that Congress would have favored
tribal exhaustion").
174 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, at Preamble.
175 See Albert A. Hale, Lessons in Sovereignty for All, INDIA CoUNTRY TODAY,
July 28, 1998, availableat 1998 WL 18037722 (in which Mr. Hale states that "[wie
understand our sovereignty is upheld or diminished by the manner in which our
courts resolve disputes. For that reason, we must give priority to protect and support our legal system.").
176 OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6, at Preamble.
177 See Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty and Its Relevance to Native Americans in
the Twenty-First Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 487, 488 (1998/1999).
178 See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79
JUDICATURE 126 (1995).
179 See id. at 126.
171
172

180 See id.
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indigenous justice paradigm, however, is based on a holistic philosophy guided by unwritten customary laws, traditions, and
practices whereby the victim is the focal point and the goal is to
heal the victim's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being
while at the same time restoring community harmony.1 8 ' Another difference between Anglo-American and indigenous systems is that the former relies on a separation of church and
state, while the latter invokes spirituality and the cleansing of
18 2
one's soul.
The Navajo Nation represents a good example of an indigenous population that has a dual system of justice.'8 3 The
Courts of the Navajo Nation were created in 1959 and reconstituted in 1985.184 These Courts were modeled after the state adversarial system and, in many ways, reflect Anglo-American
law and procedures. 8 5 In addition, there also exist traditional
8 6
Navajo law and custom.'
Traditional Navajo tort law is based on "nalyeeh," which is
a demand by a victim to be made whole for an injury. 8 7 In
"nalyeeh," one who is hurt is not concerned with intent, causation, fault, or negligence."' Rather, a restorative justice is invoked in which the focus is on compensation, which will restore
good relations to the members of the community. 8 9 In determining compensation, the victim's feelings and the perpetrator's ability to pay are more important than damages
determined by using a precise measure of losses.' 90 This contrasts the Anglo-American adjudication process, which is preoc181 See
182

id. at 127.

See id.

183 See The Honorable Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It". Navajo Justice
Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 186 (1994).
184 See id.
185 See id. Some argue that indigenous groups like the Navajo were forced to
adopt such systems in order to gain respect from state and federal judiciary. See
B.J. Jones, Tribal Courts: Protectors of the Native Paradigm of Justice, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 87, 91 (1997). The Neztsosie case was in this court system and
subject to the Navajo rules of civil procedure that were modeled aftr and reflect
Anglo-American procedures.
186 See The Honorable Robert Yazzie, supra note 183.
198 Id. at 184.

188 See id.
189 See id. at 185.
190 See id.
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cupied with the "truth" and strives to make one party the villain
and the other party the victim. 19 1
The differences between Anglo-American law and traditional Navajo law are a reflection of the cultures from which
they are created. Although each purports to achieve justice, the
type of justice and means by which it is sought can be quite
different. Such differences may also show why both the U.N.
Draft Declaration and OAS Draft Declaration recognize the importance of independent indigenous legal systems. More is at
stake, however, than mere legal differences. Cultural factors
may also affect the outcome of a case that is taken from the
tribal court and adjudicated in federal court.
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 192 the lawsuit involved injuries allegedly sustained from ingestion of toxic and
radioactive chemicals. 19 3 According to the plaintiffs, El Paso
operated open-pit uranium mines within the Navajo Nation in
the 1950's and 1960's, and upon cessation of mining activities,
the mines were left open and eventually collected large quantities of water. 19 4 The water in the open pits subsequently became polluted with radioactive materials and a host of other
toxic materials.' 9 5 In the early 1970s, the Neztsosies used the
water "for drinking, bathing, swimming, clothes laundering and
stock watering."' 9 6 As a result, the Neztsosie children suffered
from severe neurological disorders, which came to be known as
1 97
"Navajo Neuropathy."
The injuries sustained by the Neztsosies and the circumstances from which they arose reflect unique characteristics of a
Navajo way of life and culture. A nomadic practice, which involves sustenance from water collected in open pit mines, may
not represent a culture with which most Anglo-Americans could
readily identify. There is room for concern about whether a fed191 See id. at 178.

192 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
193 Id.

at 477.

194 See Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
526 U.S. 473 (1999), available at 1999 WL 14509 at JA *19a (U.S. Resp. Brief,
Joint Appendix).
195 See id. at *19a, *23a, *24a.
196 See id. at *19a, *23a.
197 Respondent's Brief, supra note 155, at 11, n.13 (citing Snyder et al., Infantile Onset and Late Central White Matter Lesions in Navajo Neuropathy, 24 ANN.
NEUROL. 327 (1988)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/7

26

2000]

RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

423

eral court and jury could identify with and understand the nomadic existence and cultural ways that took the Neztsosies to
the watering holes in the first place. In addition, through the
course of litigation, it would not be surprising if other aspects of
Navajo culture, including traditional customs involving
medicine and healing were examined and if a jury was asked to
evaluate mitigating or contributing circumstances. If members
of a federal jury have never been a part of the Navajo culture
and have no knowledge of Navajo medicine and spiritual healing, then how can they be expected to fairly evaluate such
factors?
One can only wonder if the cultural and legal differences
will affect the outcome of the Neztsosie's case as well as other
cases that may arise in the future. But whether or not justice is
served, the Neztsosies will not get it from the Courts of the Navajo Nation. 198 Instead, the Neztsosies must trust a federal
court and jury to judge their practices, sacred ceremonies, customs, and traditions, and hope that some day the declarations
of indigenous people will be heard in Washington.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The growing movement in international law to recognize
and protect the rights of indigenous peoples has culminated in
two declarations of change: the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the Commission on Human
Rights1 9 9 and the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 20 0 Both Declarations contain specific statements
regarding the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy legal and judicial independence from the State. Although neither declaration has been fully adopted by member states, each represents
20
the aspirations of indigenous groups throughout the world. '
In the United States, the policy of tribal sovereignty, embodied in the tribal-exhaustion rule, appears to harmonize well
198 See generally El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, No. CIV 96-49-PCTRGS (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2000) (on remand from the Supreme Court and 9 th Circuit
Court of Appeals, order granting permanent injunction against suit in Navajo tribal court).

199 See generally U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
200 See generally OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6.
201 See Hannum, supra note 177, at 493.
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with the OAS and U.N. Draft Declarations regarding legal independence. Even this limited reservation of sovereignty, however, has not been sustained by the Supreme Court in recent
decisions. 20 2 Rather, the Supreme Court has charted a course
in Strate v. A-1 Contractors20 3 and in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v.
Neztsosie20 4 which is "neither constitutionally authorized nor
constitutionally limited;" 20 5 a course which is even less legitimate in light of the growing international movement respecting
indigenous rights.

202 See generally Strate, 520 U.S. at 438; Burlington N. R. R. Co., 522 U.S. at
801; El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
203 Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
204 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
205 Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 462.
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